The Dutch Election Marks No Centrist Revival — It Exposed the Right’s Enduring Dominance
With Rob Jetten, the Netherlands may get its first progressive PM since 2002, but he will probably lead a right-leaning coalition.
When the exit poll appeared on the screen, international headlines were quick to declare a victory for the political centre. “Liberals halt far-right surge,” read one wire story; another called it “Europe’s centrist comeback.”
On the surface, that story seems plausible. The social liberal party D66, led by Rob Jetten, narrowly topped the poll with 16.9% of the vote, edging out Geert Wilders’ far-right PVV by just 15,000 ballots. For the first time since its foundation in 1966, D66 finished as the largest party.
Yet if you zoom out and consider the full result, a very different story emerges.
At 16.9%, D66’s share makes it the smallest “largest party” ever to win a Dutch general election. For comparison: in 1994, CDA leader Eelco Brinkman resigned after taking 22%; in 2002, both PvdA’s Ad Melkert and VVD’s Hans Dijkstal stepped down after receiving 15%; and in 2010, then–Prime Minister Jan Peter Balkenende quit when his CDA fell to 13%. Now, 17% is enough to claim victory. The result reflects not a centrist resurgence but a fragmentation of the Dutch party system — and within that fragmentation, the political right continues to set the structural terms of debate.
A Fragmented Map Disguised as Stability
The Dutch election produced one of the most fragmented parliaments in modern history. Five parties finished within a few percentage points of each other — from D66 in first at 16.9% to CDA in fifth at 11.8% — making coalition formation complex and unpredictable.
Yet, behind the surface volatility, the underlying blocs have barely shifted. Combined, the far-right and right-populist parties — PVV, JA21, FvD, BBB, and SGP — won roughly 32% of the vote, only a marginal decline from the 33% that this ideological bloc captured in 2023. Add the VVD that has only moved further to the right under the leadership of Dilan Yeşilgöz, and the conservative right’s combined strength sits at 47% which is marginally lower than its record high 2023 score.
In other words: the Dutch electorate has not moved leftward. It has simply reshuffled within the boundaries of an increasingly right-leaning spectrum.
That underlying dynamic makes the international framing — a “centrist win over the far-right” — misleading. D66’s success is largely a function of tactical voting, candidate visibility, and the temporary retreat of Wilders, not a structural realignment.
How D66 Pulled Ahead
The story of D66’s victory is one of strategy, timing, and circumstance. After months of stagnating around 8% in the polls, the social liberals surged in the campaign’s final weeks. Several factors contributed:
Geert Wilders skipped the crucial RTL tv debate on 12 October. Having triggered the snap election by collapsing the previous government, the PVV leader appeared to assume his dominance was secure. He cancelled debate appearances, withdrew from several media interviews, and left a vacuum in the televised debates. Jetten was invited to replace him in the crucial RTL debate — an appearance that transformed his visibility. After this debate, D66’s polling numbers started to surge.
Jetten’s campaign was disciplined and upbeat. Borrowing the tone of Obama’s and Trudeau’s campaigns, he ran under a positive “Yes, we can”-style message, focusing on competence and optimism. This was in contrast to the ‘play safe’ campaigns of christian democrat CDA and centre-left GL/PvdA. Appearances on a popular game show for several weeks during the campaign broadened Jetten’s appeal beyond D66’s traditional base of urban professionals.
D66 ran a dual campaign. Online, it targeted young progressives with pro-Palestine, pro-education, and pro-housing (build 10 new cities) messaging. In mainstream media, D66 presented itself as more moderate than before (signalling it is open for stricter asylum policies) and willing to unite parties for the sake of political stability — in contrast to the collapsed Schoof government marked by a year of constant infighting. This allowed D66 to attract both younger left-leaning voters from GL/PvdA, SP and Volt, and centrist moderates from VVD and NSC.
GL/PvdA underperformed. The left alliance, led by former European Commissioner Frans Timmermans, ran a safe, uninspired campaign. Timmermans’ reputation for experience reassured insiders but failed to energise voters, many of whom associated him with the political establishment. In a sense, this resembles the 2015 Canadian election. The left-leaning NDP led in the polls and wanted to present itself as ready to govern. Hence, it tried to play safe by adopting fiscal conservatism. In contrast, the Trudeau Liberals promised to run deficits for big investment policies which inspired voters. Similarly during the crucial RTL debate, D66-leader Jetten guaranteed his government would build 100,000 homes per year while Timmermans together with the leaders of CDA and VVD did not dare to make such a promise.
CDA stumbled. Its leader, Henri Bontenbal, was on course to become prime minister, polling in second to Wilders’ PVV. But Bontenbal alienated secular voters when he appeared to defend religious schools accused of intolerance toward LGBT students. That moment sent centrist liberals to D66.
Rising polls energised tactical votes. As D66 started surging in the polls, tactical voters from the left placed their bet on the social liberals as the one to beat Geert Wilders as largest party. Rob Jetten campaigned in the final days saying “we can beat Wilders” which mobilised progressive voters.
This multifaceted strategy has worked as D66 is narrowly the largest party of the country. However, it also left D66 with a fragile, internally divided electorate with voters coming from both the left and centre-right. This electoral coalition is fresh and was only built in the final three weeks of the campaign. D66 has a tendency of yo-yo’ing during elections with rapid electoral highs and quick demises. Whether this new voter coalition is sustainable remains to be seen. And that tension will define the months of coalition talks ahead.
Why a Centrist Coalition Is Unlikely
In the hours after the election, Jetten said his preference was for a “broad centrist coalition” including VVD, CDA, and GL/PvdA. On paper, that formula — four pro-European, institutionally experienced parties — would seem logical. In practice, it is almost impossible.
The main obstacle is the VVD. The liberal-conservative party, now under the leadership of Dilan Yeşilgöz since Mark Rutte’s departure in 2023, built its campaign on a single promise: no government with GL/PvdA. That message succeeded in reclaiming conservative voters who had drifted toward PVV and JA21. This saved VVD from the electoral annihilation that polls predicted during the summer. Reversing it now would provoke a rebellion among its base. VVD-friendly media such as the Telegraaf newspaper already emphasise that a centrist coalition would be “treason”.
Polling data from EenVandaag paints the picture clearly:
More than 80% of VVD voters reject any partnership with GL/PvdA.
For D66, the opposite risk exists: roughly half its base would oppose a coalition involving the right-wing populist JA21. Yet the electoral cost of that move is likely smaller than the backlash VVD would face for working with the left.
The result is a familiar stalemate. D66 insists on a centrist alliance; VVD refuses. Insiders in both parties acknowledge that the deadlock could persist for months, possibly until after the March 2026 local elections as parties would not want to campaign with painful u-turns on earlier election promises.
Most observers expect a repeat of the pattern seen in previous formations: an initial failed attempt at a centrist coalition, followed by a pragmatic compromise on the right.
That compromise would likely involve D66, VVD, CDA, and JA21, possibly with external support from Christian Union. Or Jetten becomes prime minister of a weak minority government with VVD and CDA. Both outcomes would confirm a recurring pattern in Dutch politics: D66 winning votes from the left, only to govern with the right. In 2021 for instance, D66 surged to 15% of the vote with the help of progressive tactical voters. The party even urged VVD’s Mark Rutte to resign as prime minister right after the election amid a major scandal, only to join Rutte’s fourth government as a junior partner eight months later.
And even if VVD were to u-turn on its promise and form government with GL/PvdA, negotiations would likely fail sooner or later. VVD could only sell such a decision if GL/PvdA has very little leverage in such a coalition so the government’s policies can be framed as ‘centre-right’. GL/PvdA would most likely not accept that.
Thus for Jetten, the likely price of becoming the Netherlands’ first openly gay Prime Minister would be to accept a broadly right-leaning policy platform. D66 might secure symbolic wins on climate or EU cooperation, but substantive left-leaning reforms (eg. a tax for millionaires, recognising Palestine) appear unlikely.
The coalition would also face challenges in the Senate, where it would lack a majority. Yet with the next provincial and Senate elections due in 2027, and defections already weakening the BBB group, few insiders expect this to block formation.
But if Jetten refuses to make such a concession to the right and VVD holds steadfast to its veto against GL/PvdA, no government can be formed and snap elections would follow.
VVD’s Recovery and the Right’s Resilience
Perhaps the most underestimated story of this election is the VVD’s comeback. As I already tweeted on election night, not D66 is the biggest winner, but VVD. Dilan Yeşilgöz danced right after the exit poll on live tv for a reason.
Written off during the summer as a party in decline — with polls showing it losing support among both conservatives and centrists — the VVD recovered to 14% by election day. The turnaround was driven by an unapologetically conservative campaign centred on one theme: opposition to GL/PvdA. A u-turn would be electoral suicide.
That message resonated, especially in the country’s rural east and conservative small towns. While D66 captured urban, wealthy municipalities such as Rozendaal — traditionally VVD strongholds — the VVD gained in the countryside, reinforcing the party’s ongoing transformation from a pragmatic urban liberal force into a culturally conservative, rural-oriented one.
This evolution has strategic consequences. The Rutte-era VVD that could negotiate with partners from left to right is dead and no longer exists. The new VVD is ideologically closer to JA21 than to D66 — a shift that constrains coalition arithmetic for years to come. The fact that VVD’s reasoning behind ruling out a government with PVV shows this: Yeşilgöz accuses Wilders of incompetence pointing at PVV causing the collapse of the Rutte I and Schoof governments, but ideologically she has no vetoes.
VVD fell to its worst election in over 50 years. Dilan Yeşilgöz inherited a party with 21% of the vote in 2021 under Rutte and has lost ground in two consecutive elections. However, VVD’ers are happy anyway as the result could have been much worse and their dream coalition from D66 to JA21 is possible.
GL/PvdA’s Missed Opportunity
For the merged GreenLeft–Labour alliance, this election was a sobering moment. GL/PvdA fell to a 12.7%, down from the 15.8% it received in 2023, despite leading the opposition against a chaotic right-wing government.
The merger was designed to unify the fragmented Dutch left into a single, credible force. Instead, the alliance has been mired in internal disputes and slow procedural politics. The process started in 2022 with the decision to merge both parties’ caucuses in the Senate. But the full merger with a new name is only scheduled for completion until June 2026. The merger’s long timeline has compounded these difficulties. For three years, the more conservative wing of the former PvdA has used the delay to criticise the project in right-leaning media, creating an image of internal division.
Frans Timmermans’ leadership also dragged down the party. Respected for his experience as a European commissioner and minister, he also symbolised continuity with the old political establishment. Polls consistently rated his personal popularity of 4 out of 10. Timmermans was also out of touch with his own base after a decade in Brussels as EU Commissioner. For instance, after the 7 October 2023 attacks, Timmermans initially came out in support of Israel, going against the pro-Palestine sentiment that had become dominant among Dutch progressives. Timmermans never succeeded in winning the hearts of his own base, let alone the rest of the population.
In some way Timmermans simply does not fit the image of what the merger is supposed to be. PvdA and GL decided to merge with the goal of making the left a relevant challenger again after years of VVD/CDA-dominance in government. In essence, the merger’s raison d’être is to break the status-quo and bring change. Timmermans, however, is viewed by most voters as part of that same status-quo. He has been in politics since 1998, served as minister in multiple governments and EU Commissioner for a decade. Hence, Timmermans failed to win the 2023 election as Omtzigt’s NSC proved to be a more credible and convincing alternative to the Rutte years for left-leaning and centrist voters, while Wilders’ PVV captured the popular discontent of right-wing voters.
Signs of Timmermans dragging the party down became again apparent in 2024. GL/PvdA topped the polls during the European Parliament elections — a campaign in which Timmermans played a minimal role. Meanwhile, GL/PvdA remained static in national polls. Many members hoped for a leadership change sooner or later. Party insiders, however, prioritised stability over renewal. The gamble failed. Timmermans has since resigned, but the damage is done. D66 successfully captured much of the progressive, urban electorate that might once have backed the left alliance.
The 39 year old Jesse Klaver, and former leader of GL, will likely lead the merging alliance for the foreseeable time until a proper leadership contest is held. The last phrase is important as Timmermans was elected leader without a challenger. Besides Klaver, other possible long-term leaders are Marjolein Moorman who won the 2022 local elections in Amsterdam or Lisa Westerveld who is popular among the base as she received over 140,000 preference votes in the last election.
However, GL/PvdA remains a power to be reckoned with. The left-wing alliance is still the largest party in the Senate.
Volatility Without Change
The Dutch electorate remains among Europe’s most volatile. Since 2017, every national or European election has produced a different “largest party”:
2017 (General) — VVD
2019 (Provincial) — FvD
2019 (European Parliament) — PvdA
2021 (General) — VVD
2023 (Provincial) — BBB
2023 (General) — PVV
2024 (European Parliament) — GL/PvdA
2025 (General) — D66
Each result has generated headlines about “realignments,” yet the underlying blocs have remained remarkably consistent. The volatility reflects frustration and distrust rather than ideological movement.
If D66 ultimately governs with the right, progressive disillusionment is likely to grow. Whether those voters drift to a newly branded GL/PvdA — which will complete its merger and rebrand in 2026 — or rally behind another outsider, as they did with Pieter Omtzigt’s NSC in 2023, remains an open question. Similarly, will VVD, CDA and JA21 be able to keep their voters happy in government? Alternatively, Wilders or another far-right party could be able to surf on yet another wave of right-wing voter disaffection.
For now, Dutch politics remains locked in a cycle of fragmentation and substitution, with each election producing a new temporary “winner” but little structural change.
Conclusion
The 2025 Dutch general election will be remembered as the year D66 became the largest party for the first time ever. But its symbolic breakthrough masks a more fundamental reality: the Dutch political centre is shrinking, and the right — in its various forms — remains the dominant force shaping government and policy.
Seventeen percent may now be enough to win an election. But as long as that victory depends on governing with parties to the right, it is not a sign of centrist revival. It is a measure of how far the political centre has moved rightward — and how fragile liberal victories have become.
A long government formation awaits us which could very well produce failed negotiations or once again an unstable government that sooner or later falls apart. The 78 year old polling guru Maurice De Hond — pollster (Peil) since the 1970s who tends to be the closest to election results — has already predicted that new elections will be held by the winter of 2026/27.